



When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments and Intergovernmental 
Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone 
 
 
This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was 
meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial 
support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the 
existing political cleavages and the creation new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the 
empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are 
tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for 
Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors’ 
positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the integration of financial 
assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the 
argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most 
powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project. 
 





Since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, eurozone policymakers have been forced to address 
a rather unfamiliar need: financial assistance for member countries.1 This exigency has challenged 
the EMU in an unprecedented manner. First, it has exposed the institutional limits of the monetary 
union (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2016; Matthijs and Blyth 2015). When the crisis started, no institutional 
framework was in place for managing sovereign liquidity crises and reducing the risks of contagion.2 
The need to extend assistance to member countries in financial distress has also challenged the 
strength of European solidarity (Jones 2012). Specifically, it showcased the distributional 
implications that arise from channelling resources to countries in need from those countries with 
stronger financial positions.  
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Eurozone policymakers have addressed these challenges through the progressive development 
of a regional financial assistance framework. That is, member countries have deepened their 
integration by designing a set of mechanisms through which the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
is now expected to address confidence crises stemming from imbalances in individual countries and 
spillover effects (ECB 2011: 73-4). As will be reviewed at greater length below, this integration 
progress culminated with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012. 
This article argues that this further step in the integration process, which was meant to remedy 
the institutional shortcomings of the EMU and mitigate the distributional implications of financial 
assistance, has instead contributed to the deepening of existing political cleavages (between creditor 
and debtor countries) and the creation of new ones (among creditors). The radicalization of 
intergovernmental negotiation has less to do with the incompleteness of European Union (EU) 
integration (Jones, Kelemen and Meunier 2016) and more to do with a specific set of ‘political 
dysfunctions’ of the kind examined in this special issue. Specifically, the article argues and illustrates 
that the empowerment of some national parliaments in the process through which financial assistance 
is decided and disbursed is a crucial contributor to the deterioration in the negotiation dynamics 
among member states.3  
Involving national parliaments in decision-making regarding financial assistance changes the 
negotiation dynamics in two important respects. On the one hand, as the logic of the two-level game 
suggests (Putnam 1988), negotiating in the shadow of domestic constraints makes compromise more 
difficult for governments whose parliaments have to approve the lending scheme. This, in turn, is 
likely to affect the negotiation process by creating incentives for brinkmanship. On the other hand, 
the involvement of national parliaments in intergovernmental decisions alters the nature of policy 
coordination among member governments. Specifically, since governments have to win the support 
of national legislatures, the incentives to accommodate differences and identify with each other’s 
problems become less influential than under conditions of intergovernmental deliberations (Bickerton, 
Hodson and Puetter 2015; Puetter 2012, 2014).  
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The article applies these theoretical arguments to the negotiations surrounding decisions on 
the three adjustment programmes for Greece. The Greek negotiations offer an almost natural 
laboratory to assess the impact of the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone. 
Whereas under the first two programmes financial assistance was delivered through ad hoc, 
temporary mechanisms within the Troika framework,4 the third programme was administered only 
through the ESM. Using a systematic analysis of the financial press and interviews with top officials 
involved in drafting the terms of the adjustment program,5 this article shows that the dynamics of the 
negotiation changed over time. Specifically, negotiations under the ESM were characterized by the 
radicalization of creditors’ position and increased divisions in the creditors’ camp. 
Of the creditor countries, the article focuses in particular on the German government’s 
position. Germany played a central role in the management of the eurozone crisis (Bulmer 2014), and 
the German Bundestag is one of the national parliaments whose powers have significantly increased 
since 2010 (Auel and Höing 2014). Furthermore, for the purposes of this analysis, the Bundestag is 
the only parliament that has to vote both ex ante and ex post on lending programmes under the ESM 
(as explained below). Analysing the evolution of the German government’s position in light of the 
changing powers assigned to the Bundestag in the bailout negotiations thus sheds a unique spotlight 
on the effects of national parliaments’ involvement on intergovernmental negotiations at the EU level.  
In order to control for alternative factors that might have influenced the German government 
position in the bailout negotiations, the article leverages as much as possible on the comparative 
method and the use of counterfactuals. In particular, it relies on the cross-time comparison of the 
three negotiation rounds and on selected cross-country comparisons. The purpose of the cross-time 
comparison is to exclude the possibility that the German position was solely influenced by the 
government’s preferences for fiscal consolidation rather than by a combination of these preferences 
and the constraints exerted by the domestic legislature. If the government’s preferences were the only 
driver of the negotiating stance, we would expect to see a radicalization in the negotiating stance 
when confronted with deviations from the fiscal targets by the Greek authorities. However, as the 
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empirical analysis is going to show, even if the first programme went off-track and the commitment 
to fiscal discipline by the Greek government was uncertain, the German government conceded to new 
financial assistance in 2012 under a programme that even contemplated a temporary relaxation in the 
fiscal conditions. Furthermore, an excessive emphasis on the German government’s preferences risks 
obscuring important differences of views within the government and cannot thoroughly explain the 
varying influence of cabinet members on the chancellor’s negotiating stance (as discussed below).  
In addition to the cross-time comparison, the article relies on selected comparisons between 
the German stance and that of other creditor countries. Specifically, the article compares the German 
negotiating stance with that of the governments most closely aligned with Germany on the bailout 
negotiations but with weaker levels of empowerment of national parliaments, as is the case for 
Finland. The purpose of this focused comparison is to try to isolate the causal influence of the 
institutional context on the dynamics of the negotiations regarding Greece.  
The analysis conducted here contributes to scholarly and public debate on the modalities that 
close EMU legitimacy deficits and strengthen the integration process. Specifically, the article signals 
the risks to eurozone integration that stem from the elevated involvement of national parliaments in 
distributive issues at the EU level – among which financial assistance decisions certainly stand out. 
To be clear, the study does not deny the important role that national parliaments can play in rendering 
EU policymaking more responsive and accountable to the citizens of the member states (Bellamy and 
Kröger 2016; Bellamy and Weale 2015). That is, it is not one of the purposes of the article to suggest 
that the Lisbon agenda to strengthen parliaments’ role in EU decision-making should be scrapped. 
However, while the post-Lisbon involvement of national parliaments with EU policymaking was 
primarily a means to bring EU affairs to the domestic level to legitimize them (e.g., Cooper 2012), 
national parliaments’ involvement with ESM policymaking has led to the paradoxical situation where 
it is not EU policy that is ‘domesticated’ but (some) domestic politics are elevated to EU-level policy. 
Before proceeding, some clarifications are in order as to the scope of the analysis. The article 
examines the implications of the institutionalization of the EU crisis management framework on the 
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creditors’ side. In this light, the article complements studies that have focused on the Greek 
negotiating position (Featherstone 2011; Tsebelis 2016) and on the politicization of EU economic 
governance in the domestic politics of member states since the start of the sovereign debt crisis 
(Leupold 2016; Roth, Jonung and Nowak-Lehmann 2015). Given the focus on intergovernmental 
negotiations, the study does not investigate the determinants of national parliaments’ positions 
towards Greece and financial assistance in general. Finally, as will be further clarified in the next 
section, the analysis focuses on parliaments’ involvement in the application (execution) of ESM treaty 
measures, not on parliaments’ involvement in the ratification of the treaty. In other words, I focus on 
the ‘ordinary’ decisions that stem from the entering the intergovernmental treaty. 
The article proceeds in three steps. The next section brings together two strands of literature 
that have flourished with the onset of the crisis but that have not been systematically engaged with 
each other thus far – namely, the literature of the involvement of national parliaments in the EU 
integration process and studies on intergovernmental decision-making. The second section examines 
the evolution of the EU crisis management system from the start of the sovereign debt crisis to the 
creation of the ESM. The third section provides empirical support for the proposition that the ESM 
contributed to deepening and expanding intra-EMU tensions.  
 
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ON THE DYNAMICS OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS  
The sovereign debt crisis has sparked renewed interest in the impact of EU integration on the domestic 
politics of member states. In particular, increasing attention has been devoted to investigating national 
parliaments’ involvement in the EU integration process (see the contributions in Auel and Höing 
2014; Bellamy and Kroger 2016; also Winzen 2012). This literature has been focused on explaining 
how national parliaments have framed EU integration and exerted control over national governments 
for decisions regarding integration at a time of unusual politicization (Kriesi and Grande 2014; see 
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also Hooghe and Marks 2009) and polarization as radical populist right and left parties voice strong 
opposition to EU politics (De Vries and Edwards 2009). 
Along with renewed interest in domestic politics, the crisis has also sparked renewed interest 
in intergovernmental decision-making. Crisis management efforts have been pivotal in this regard as 
the European Council and the European Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) have 
taken the lead in coordinating policy. In one calculation, for instance, the European Council, which 
is expected to meet ‘twice every six months’ (TEU Article 15.3), met nine times in 2011, six times 
in 2012, six times in 2013 and six times in 2014.6 In short, the European Council has become ‘the 
centre of political gravity’ in Europe (Puetter 2012: 161). This conclusion is reinforced by the 
weakening of domestic and supranational institutions in the EU decision-making process. For 
instance, Sergio Fabbrini (2015: 145) notes that ‘national parliaments … had very limited impact on 
intergovernmental decision-making’ during the crisis. At the same time, several scholars have 
identified a progressive erosion of the Commission’s power of initiative as a driver of EU integration 
(Hodson 2013) and the European Parliament’s ability to act as a check on the European Council and 
euro group decisions. In a scathing analysis, Vivien A. Schmidt (2015: 18), for example, notes that 
‘The EP has been sidelined in Eurozone governance, leaving it little formal legislative role in 
Eurozone policy formulation, which is mainly the domain of the Council, and little formal control 
over the Commission in the European Semester, let alone over the “Troika”.’ 
This study brings together the two strands of literature discussed thus far – the literature of 
the involvement of national parliaments in the EU integration process and the literature on 
intergovernmental decision-making. Specifically, the article explores the implications of national 
parliaments’ involvement for the dynamic of intergovernmental negotiations. Little research thus far 
has investigated this relationship beyond an examination of the indirect control mechanisms that 
national parliments exert on governments (Winzen 2012). Liberal intergovernmentalist works on the 
management of the euro crisis have come closest to discovering the connection between the 
involvement of domestic actors in intergovernmental negotiations (Schimmelfennig 2015). However, 
 7 
in keeping with the focus of this research tradition – according to which the relevant domestic actors 
and interests vary by issue area – significant attention has been placed on the influence of business 
and government preferences rather than on the influence exerted by national parliaments 
(Schimmelfennig 2015: 180) 
In the following, I specify how national parliaments’ involvement in the making of decisions 
regarding EU integration can affect the intergovernmental bargaining process. In doing so, I build on 
the literature on how domestic factors affect international negotiations. Since Putnam’s powerful 
metaphor of the two-level game (Putnam 1988), the relevance of domestic ratification constraints for 
international negotiation outcomes has been extensively ascertained and investigated. These 
constraints, which include the ‘interplay of institutional requirements necessary to ratify an 
international treaty’ (Hug and König 2001, 453), are important to international negotiations because 
they hinge on the negotiators’ room for manoeuvre in formulating a negotiating position and 
accepting a deal. The logic here is the negotiating stance reflects not only the negotiators’ own 
preferences but also those of the relevant domestic ratification actors. In other words, negotiators 
anticipate the reaction of the domestic actors that have to ratify the international treaty, adjusting the 
negotiating stance in a manner that allows the exaction an acceptable deal for those actors. To use 
Putnam’s language, the ‘win-set’ of the negotiator is influenced by domestic actors’ preferences and 
institutions (Putnam 1988, 442-450). Although significant differences of view exist as to what 
domestic configuration provides international negotiators with more bargaining power over others,7 
the importance of domestic factors for the outcome of international negotiations is rarely called into 
question.  
This article builds on this research tradition but also shifts the focus away from the outcome 
of the negotiations to their process. Specifically, I propose two expectations regarding the ways in 
which the involvement of national parliaments is likely to affect the dynamic of intergovernmental 
negotiations in the EU. The first expectation relates to the intensity of the political cleavages during 
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the negotiations. Previous studies have shown that intergovernmental negotiations are characterized 
by definition ‘by hard bargaining and brinkmanship’ (Schimmelfennig 2015: 185). However, the 
extent of brinkmanship is far from static, otherwise it would be difficult to account for why some 
intergovernmental bargains are concluded quite quickly and others require extremely lengthy 
negotiations (Tsebelis and Hahm 2014). Hence, it is plausible to expect brinkmanship to vary 
according to the domestic constraints that governments face when negotiating with their peers. The 
implication of this proposition is testable. Specifically, we should expect to see increased 
brinkmanship across time and in conjunction with the increased involvement of national parliaments, 
whose approval of international deals represents one of the tightest constraints a government faces in 
supranational negotiations.8   
The second expectation relates to the number of political cleavages that become relevant 
during the negotiations. Specifically, I expect that national parliaments’ involvement is associated 
with an increase in the number of rifts. As a former European Central Bank (ECB) member observes, 
‘The explicit involvement of national parliaments, especially in Germany, gives the impression that 
it is ultimately up to the latter to agree on whether another Eurozone country can access the ESM and 
receive financial assistance. This creates a direct opposition between countries … which is very 
detrimental to the process of political integration’ (Bini Smaghi 2015, 761). In other words, the 
expectation is that the incorporation of national parliaments in decisions related to financial assistance 
increases the likelihood of, and the motivations for, disagreement among member states. For this 
proposition to hold, the empirical analysis should find a repositioning in member states’ negotiating 
stance over time – in particular, a repositioning among previously aligned governments as a function 
of the modalities of national parliaments’ involvement. 
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CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE EUROZONE 
The theory of how to stem financial instability is well established at the domestic level. It revolves 
around the notion of the lender of last resort (LoLR) – a role usually assigned to the central bank. 9 
In providing emergency liquidity assistance to banks that are solvent but illiquid, the central bank can 
prevent panic-driven bank runs, the fire sales of assets and a breakdown in the credit system; any one 
of these circumstances can create a chain of events that can have significant negative macroeconomic 
consequences.10 
On the heels of the integration of global capital markets and in light of the experience of the 
crises in the emerging markets in the 1990s, increasing attention has been paid to the issue of the need 
for an international LoLR for sovereign states (Fischer 1999; Giannini 1999). 11  In this debate, 
attention inevitably focused on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, the IMF has long 
performed the role of crisis manager for its members (Boughton 2000). Specifically, the Fund has 
contributed to curbing panic in sovereign debt markets by providing financial assistance to countries 
that are not able to finance themselves at a sustainable rate.  
In addition to the IMF, several regional financing arrangements exist whose purpose is to 
provide financial assistance to countries in difficulties, drawing resources pooled or committed at the 
regional level (for a review, see IMF 2013). Among these, the system that was developed in the 
eurozone after the start of the crisis provides one of the most recent examples. Initially, this system 
was based on a temporary crisis resolution mechanism: the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF).12 Confronted with continued financial turbulence, euro area authorities eventually boosted 
the profile of their crisis management framework, creating the permanent ESM as of mid-2013 (see 
Gocaj and Meunier 2013; Schwarzer 2015).  
According to the founding Treaty, the ESM is responsible for providing temporary financial 
assistance packages to euro area member states under strict conditionality.13 Specifically, financial 
assistance is linked to the implementation of economic measures specified in a memorandum of 
understanding between the member state and the European Commission, which acts as the negotiating 
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agent for the ESM and monitors programme implementation. The ESM’s main decision-making body 
is the Board of Governors, consisting of the finance ministers of each ESM member, as well as the 
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the ECB president as observers.  
The decision to grant stability support to an ESM member is usually taken by the Board of 
Governors through mutual agreement.14 As the ESM (2015a) itself clarifies, mutual agreement entails 
that ‘the decision will be adopted only if all Governors vote in favour of the decision or abstain’. In 
deciding on ESM activities, members of the Board of Governors are subject to national procedures. 
These apply to both the decision to grant, ‘in principle’, stability support (for example, the decision 
to grant the Commission the mandate to negotiate a memorandum of understanding) and the approval 
of the outcome of the negotiations with the country that requests financial assistance (ESM 2015b). 
National procedures may entail approval from the government but might also require parliamentary 
consultation or even a parliamentary vote, which would be the most demanding requirement.  
Looking into the national procedures of euro area countries, the national parliament of only 
one country – Germany – is involved in approving stability support both ex ante (on the decision to 
start the negotiations between the ESM and the member country seeking financial assistance) and ex 
post (on the outcome of the negotiations). This power derives from a national constitutional choice. 
Specifically, a series of judgements were issued by the German Constitutional Court following the 
start of the sovereign debt crisis through which the court specified the conditions under which 
Bundestag authorization is required to safeguard the parliament’s budgetary responsibility (see, e.g., 
Höing 2012). In other countries, legislatures vote either ex ante (for instance Austria) or ex post 
(Estonia, the Netherlands and Spain) in their plenary format – or are not required to vote at all.15 
Among the creditor countries most closely aligned to Germany in their ‘hawkish’ stance towards 
Greece, it is worth noting that Finland’s decisions pertaining to ESM loans are subject to the scrutiny 
of a parliamentary committee and not of a plenary session (for an overview of the different modalities 
of national parliaments’ involvement, see Kreilinger 2015).  
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FROM THE FIRST TO THE THIRD ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME FOR GREECE 
The Greek crisis provides a natural case study to ascertain the effects of the integration of financial 
assistance capacity on the political cleavages among member states. Indeed, the negotiations for 
providing Greece with financial support proceeded in parallel to (and were often a major driver of) 
the development of the new crisis management system. This is well reflected in the modalities through 
which financial assistance was disbursed in the three adjustment programmes, with only the last 
programme covered entirely through the ESM.16 
In the following, I trace the negotiations of the Greek adjustment programmes showing the 
progressive stiffening of creditors’ positions towards Greece and growing divisions among creditor 
countries.  
 
The Beginning: The First and the Second Adjustment Programmes 
Greek economic problems can be traced back to the period following the country’s accession to the 
eurozone. Because of declining borrowing costs, the country’s fiscal position deteriorated as public 
spending increased, especially spending in social transfers and pension benefits. Aside from the 
deterioration in the fiscal balance, the upward trend in relative wages and prices had undermined 
Greek competitiveness, creating a very large current account deficit.  
When the newly elected Papandreou government revealed in October 2009 that the budget 
deficit would amount to 12.5 per cent of GDP, more than twice that previously reported, Greece’s 
problems appeared quite small from a systemic perspective – Greece represents approximately 2 per 
cent of the eurozone’s GDP. Given its level of financial integration into the eurozone, however, 
Greece’s problems shook the stability of the monetary union and required substantial international 
support. 
This support materialized in the form of conditional financial assistance negotiated with the 
Troika in May 2010. Specifically, the eurogroup agreed to provide bilateral loans pooled by the 
European Commission through an ad hoc facility for a total of €80 billion, which was to be disbursed 
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over the period of May 2010 through June 2013. The financial assistance supported by eurozone 
member states was part of a joint package that included a €30 billion IMF loan. As for its content, the 
programme pursued a twofold strategy. First, it aimed at bringing domestic demand in line with 
domestic supply capacity through a substantial fiscal adjustment on the order of 11 per cent of GDP 
during 2010–13 in addition to the 5 per cent of GDP in measures adopted in 2010. Second, the 
programme aimed at improving competitiveness through the implementation of structural reforms. 
The focus was on streamlining public administration and liberalizing Greece’s rigid labour markets 
to set the stage for long-term economic growth.17 
By the summer of 2011, however, it became clear that all major economic projections were 
off track; GDP had contracted more than expected and public debt as a share of GDP continued to 
rise (IMF 2011: 66). Competitiveness gains also lagged programme projections amid increasing 
difficulties in political stability and administrative capacity that the Greek government faced in 
implementing structural reforms (European Commission 2012: 1). Against this deteriorating 
economic outlook, negotiations for a second adjustment programme were initiated. 
Negotiations were not easy and often stormy. Talks between international creditors and the 
Greek government were repeatedly contentious over budgetary measures, including those related to 
the reduction of minimum wages and the elimination of salary bonuses granted to private sector 
workers (see, e.g. Financial Times 2012a). The question of how to reduce Greece’s debt also stood 
front and centre, especially in the autumn of 2011, when fears of contagion gripped the eurozone. On 
27 October, the eurogroup announced a series of measures to restore financial stability, including a 
‘voluntary’ agreement with Greek private creditors to reduce the value of outstanding debt18 – a 
measure that would be inserted in the second adjustment programme.  
Germany was a tough negotiator from the beginning. In the months that preceded the first 
adjustment programme, the German government played a key role in ensuring that the Greek bailout 
would not be mistaken for unconditional support from eurozone partners. To achieve this goal, ‘the 
only strategy that would work [from Merkel’s perspective] was to demand that Greece impose severe 
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domestic policies as a condition for the bailout’ (Bastasin 2014: 193). The same emphasis on domestic 
discipline was articulated in the second round of negotiations. For instance, in one of the proposals 
circulated during the negotiations for the new memorandum of understanding in early 2012, Germany 
suggested the creation of a euro area ‘budget commissioner’ with the power to veto budget decisions 
taken by the Greek government if they were not in line with targets set by international lenders 
(Financial Times 2012a). Germany’s position was far from being an isolated voice, and eurozone 
countries displayed a highly cohesive front towards Greece. This was particularly evident in 
November 2011 when the Greek prime minister, George Papandreou, floated the idea of putting the 
proposed bailout programme to a popular vote. On that occasion, he ‘was stunned by the outpouring 
of anger from EU leaders’ at a meeting convened in Cannes to discuss the matter (Spiegel 2014). At 
that juncture, France and Germany were closely aligned and the strategy on how to address Greek 
political leadership was carefully coordinated (Bastasin 2012: 336).  
Despite this tough stance towards Greece, eurozone finance ministers eventually and quickly 
agreed upon a second rescue package at the end of February. Specifically, eurozone countries 
committed to disburse up to €130 billion through the EFSF, until 2014.19 The IMF also contributed 
to the financing package with additional funding. As part of the agreement, the private sector accepted 
losses on its holdings of Greek debt. Furthermore, and in line with the previous programme, structural 
reforms were required in labour, product and service markets.20  
That there was agreement on the second programme should not be taken for granted, 
especially when analysed from the German perspective. Indeed, the German government, and in 
particular Chancellor Merkel, pushed the agreement on a reluctant political base. Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) members of the Bundestag were 
particularly concerned about the prospect of more financing along the way, especially in light of 
shaky pledges of fiscal discipline from the Greek authorities. The conservative Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung well summarized these concerns in the final stages of the negotiations, noting, 
‘Additional aid for Athens is unavoidable … Greece and other nations in crisis continue to live 
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beyond their means, spending significantly more than they earn even though they actually need a 
surplus’ (as translated in Spiegel Online International 2012a). The risk of continuing to throw good 
money after bad is evident in the positioning of several members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
group. For instance, Thomas Silberhorn of the CSU was reported as saying, ‘if we don’t limit the 
financial assistance, we will run up against the limits of political acceptance’. Striking a similar note, 
Transport Minister Peter Ramsauer (CSU) announced he would only agree to the Greek aid package 
‘with fists clenched in my pockets’ (Spiegel Online International 2012b). The outcome of the vote on 
the second bailout showcased how fragile the political support for the German government was. 
‘Within the CDU/CSU bloc, 13 politicians rejected the bailout, with four members of the FDP [Free 
Democratic Party] joining them in opposition. Ultimately, Merkel had to rely on support from the 
opposition centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Greens’ (Spiegel Online International 
2012c). Even within the government, support for further financial assistance had been a divisive issue 
during the negotiations. This is well exemplified in the public stance of Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble, who had called into question Greece’s commitment to austerity measures, and in the 
remarks of Peter Altmaier, one of Merkel’s most important advisers, who also emphasized that Greek 
fiscal commitment was an ‘extremely decisive prerequisite’ for the release of further assistance 
(Spiegel Online International 2012d). 
Despite the visible discontent in her political party, Merkel put her weight behind the second 
bailout by openly inviting the parliament to support the new programme (Spiegel Online International 
2012e). This happened even though the second programme slowed the pace of fiscal adjustment in 
anticipation of the potential deflationary effects of the required structural reforms, especially those in 
the labour market (see Moschella 2016). In particular, the programme allowed a primary deficit of 1 
per cent of GDP in 2012 and backloaded the bulk of fiscal adjustment to 2013–14. 
Reading Merkel’s stance against what would have happened in the third round of negotiations, 
it is thus plausible to argue that the chancellor had more room for manoeuvre to make concessions at 
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the EU negotiating table in 2012 than would be the case just a few years later. Using the language of 
the two-level game, the preferences of the chief negotiator prevailed over the institutional constraints. 
That Merkel’s domestic constraints were not as binding as they were to become in the 2015 
negotiations is also evident in the German position on the possibility of Greece exiting the monetary 
union – ‘Grexit’. During the negotiations for the second adjustment programme, Schäuble had hinted 
at the possibility of Greece leaving the euro with enough financial support to stay in the EU (Financial 
Times 2015a). Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, a member of the CSU, was more direct, arguing 
openly for a Greek exit from the euro zone. As he told Der Spiegel at the end of February 2012, 
‘Greece’s chances of regenerating itself and becoming competitive are surely greater outside the 
monetary union than if it remains in the euro area’ (Spiegel Online International 2012b). In spite of 
the evident divisions in the government, the German chancellor rejected the Grexit option in 2012. 
‘We want Greece to stay in the euro’, Merkel clearly spelled out after a meeting with French president, 
Nicholas Sarkozy (Financial Times 2012b), a position later reiterated in front of the parliament when 
agreement on the new bailout had been reached (Spiegel Online International (2012e).  
The second adjustment programme quickly went off track. By October, a new standoff 
between international lenders and Greek authorities had developed over how to keep the bailout 
programme on track (Financial Times 2012c). In November, the eurogroup attempted to address the 
problem of Greek debt sustainability through a set of measures designed to ease Greece’s debt burden. 
These measures included a reduction in the interest rate charged to Greece on the bilateral loans 
provided under the first adjustment programme, extending the maturity of the loans extended thus far 
by 15 years and deferring interest rate payments by 10 years (ESM 2015a). The programme survived 
its rocky start, but new problems lay ahead. 
The situation deteriorated at the end of 2014 when the Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, 
brought the presidential election forward by two months after eurozone finance ministers concluded 
that Greece had not completed all the reforms necessary to obtain its last bailout payment and 
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complete the programme. Specifically, on 19 December, the EFSF Board extended the programme 
until the end of February 2015 (EFSF 2014). 
In the meantime, January elections brought Alexis Tsipras to power, the Syriza party leader 
who vowed to end fiscal austerity and renegotiate Greece’s government debt if his party came to 
power. In line with his electoral pledges, once in power, Tsipras refused to seek an extension of the 
second adjustment programme and asked instead for a new agreement that would contemplate 
significant debt relief. Eventually, eurozone partners decided on a further extension until 30 June 
2015. 
At the end of June, however, negotiations on the second adjustment programme eventually 
collapsed following the Greek decision to call a surprise referendum on the programme’s conditions. 
In the July vote, Greeks overwhelmingly rejected the bailout. However, Tsipras was also mandated 
to negotiate a new programme. It was the beginning of a third and tougher round of negotiations.  
 
The Toughening: The Third Adjustment Programme  
Negotiations for a third adjustment programme took place in a different institutional context from the 
one within which previous adjustment programmes had been agreed: the ESM had come into force 
in September 2012. Furthermore, the IMF signalled that it could no longer join the creditors’ camp, 
as Greece no longer qualified for support because of its high debt levels and its poor record of 
reforms.21 This is the institutional context within which Greek authorities negotiated what has been 
dubbed ‘the most intrusive economic supervision programme ever mounted in the EU’ (Financial 
Times 2015b; see also The Economist 2015). The proposal required Greek authorities to pass new 
reform laws on taxes and pensions and to introduce labour market liberalization. The government 
was also asked to reverse some of the spending measures it had introduced since the elections and to 
set up a trust that would be used to pay for bank recapitalization and to repay debt (Financial Times 
2015c).  
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The hardening of the creditors’ requests reflects the need to concede to national parliaments 
and, in particular, the Bundestag. As the Financial Times aptly observed, ‘German MPs’ views [now 
became] critically important because parliament must approve any deal that involves lending Athens 
more money’ (Financial Times 2015d). The Bundestag, in turn, was in no mood to provide Greece 
with further assistance. Rather, as had been the case for the 2012 negotiations, German 
parliamentarians had deep reservations about the bailout. This is especially evident in the public 
posturing of CDU/CSU members – although SPD members shared most of the reservations as 
detailed below. In particular, members of Chancellor Merkel’s CDU voiced doubts about the new 
Greek government’s commitment to reforms and about the strategy of keeping financing the country 
(Handelsblatt Global Edition 2015a).  
While no government in a parliamentary democracy can easily gloss over the concerns of the 
parties that support it, in the case under investigation the voice from the Bundestag became even more 
difficult to ignore as its members were now called on to approve the beginning of the third round of 
negotiations. The increasing attention to the preferences of national lawmakers was clearly detectable 
in the evolution of Merkel’s negotiating stance. As the negotiations with the Greek authorities 
proceeded, the German chancellor explicitly stated that for her to ‘recommend with full conviction’ 
any deal to the German parliament, the Greek authorities should have taken steps to implement the 
suggested reforms (Financial Times 2015b) – implying that she could not compromise on further 
concessions as the bailout terms had to accommodate most of the sceptics in her conservative bloc 
(Financial Times 2015e).22  
At the same time, and as a sign of increased brinkmanship compared to previous negotiations, 
Merkel moved closer to the negotiating position of her hawkish finance minister. For instance, when 
Schäuble proposed a possible five-year timeout from the eurozone for Greece (Financial Times 
2015f), Merkel did not overrule the suggestion as she had back in 2012, but instead backed it in front 
of the Bundestag, where she presented a ‘voluntary, organized Grexit as a viable option’ (Financial 
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Times 2015g).  
While Merkel’s tougher stance could be ascribed to negotiation fatigue and to her change of 
mind on the need to keep Greece in the eurozone, several accounts indicate that this was political 
posturing rather than to a change in political preferences. Indeed, it is difficult to conclude that Merkel 
now became convinced that pushing Greece out of the eurozone was the best way of dealing with the 
crisis. In the middle of the July negotiations, she was still concerned at the prospect of European 
disintegration, not least for its impact on her historical legacy (Spiegel Online International 2015f). 
Furthermore, Merkel continued justifying the negotiations in light of the decision taken by eurozone 
leaders to rule out ‘Grexit’ (Handelsblatt Global Edition 2015b). In other words, as had been the case 
in 2012, Merkel’s preferences were inclined towards a compromise.  
In contrast to 2012, however, discontent in her party and government was more constraining 
at the EU table because of the Bundestag’s formal involvement in the procedure through which 
financial assistance would be disbursed. Furthermore, opposition to financial support for Greece was 
not confined to CDU/CSU Bundestag members. Greece’s decision to abandon the negotiations and 
call a referendum had alienated several Social Democrats too (Handelsblatt Global Edition 2015c). 
In a sign of growing discomfort in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) camp, Sigmar Gabriel, the 
party leader, told the Tagesspiegel newspaper that Greek premier Tsipras had ‘pulled down the last 
bridges over which Europe and Greece could have moved to a compromise’ (quoted in Financial 
Times 2015h).  
In this changed institutional context, the hawkish stance of some members of her government 
became more influential on Merkel’s negotiating stance than in the previous negotiation round. For 
instance, asked about Schäuble’s comment that he was prepared to resign if he was ever forced to 
take a position on Greece that he did not agree with, Merkel replied that ‘the finance minister will 
now lead these negotiations just as I will’, adding, ‘We will now work together in this coalition and 
of course together in the [Christian Democratic] Union’ (Handelsblatt Global Edition 2015b). The 
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nod to Grexit should also be read as a further attempt by the chancellor to smooth over the differences 
within her party over Greece. Commenting on the parliamentary debate, Eckhardt Rehberg, the 
CDU’s budget spokesman, said: ‘The debate over a temporary Grexit has been important’ (Financial 
Times 2015i), hinting at the chancellor’s attempts to win the support of a growing pro-Grexit lobby 
in her CDU/CSU party. 
The hardening of the German position, in turn, contributed to the fuelling of discontent in the 
creditors’ camp. In particular, France became increasingly vocal in its discontent at the German 
approach to Greece and put its political weight alongside that of the European Commission in an 
attempt to keep Greece in the eurozone (e.g., Financial Times 2015f, 2015j).  
The growing divisions in the creditors’ camp are particularly evident in the debate that 
followed Germany’s proposal to push Greece towards a temporary exit from the eurozone. Although 
Schäuble’s tough stance was supported by several other small countries – stretching from the 
Netherlands to Finland to Estonia, and countries that had endured their own adjustment programmes 
(such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland) (Financial Times 2015k) – around the negotiating table, 
divisions became evident and vocal. In addition to France, Austria’s Chancellor Werner Faymann 
criticized the tone of the debate, noting that ‘Such humiliation [for Greece] cannot be’ (Financial 
Times 2015e). The Italian finance minister expressed similar concerns (La Stampa 2015).  
Several factors certainly contributed to shaping these political coalitions among eurozone 
governments, including the support of public opinion, political business cycles and economic 
conditions. This is particularly notable in Finland, one of German’s closest ally on the negotiations, 
where the populist Finns Party threatened to resign from the coalition government if a Greek bailout 
went ahead (Financial Times 2015l). However, it is interesting to note that the emerging coalition for 
a more lenient approach to Greece included countries whose legislatures had not approved the 
outcome of the intergovernmental negotiation. Indeed, the French parliament voted at the start of the 
negotiations, although the vote was neither required nor legally binding (see Fromage 2015). The 
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Austrian parliament is required to vote only ex ante in the ESM procedure, while the Italian 
parliament is not involved at all (see Kreilinger 2015). In contrast, in the hard-line coalition were all 
the countries where the legislature is required to vote on the outcome of the negotiations – the 
Netherlands, Estonia and Spain (see Kreilinger 2015).   
As the negotiations with the Greek authorities moved closer to a deal, 23  the German 
government’s position did not relax. This hardened position stood in stark contrast to the more 
accommodative stance taken by other hawkish eurozone countries, most notably Finland, which was 
ready to accept a deal in early August (Financial Times 2015m). In contrast, however, Germany had 
yet to put the outcome of the negotiations to the vote of the Bundestag. In other words, the German 
government’s room for concessions was much more constrained. As a result, the stance towards 
Greece could not have been significantly relaxed, even if it brought growing isolation at the 
negotiating table.  
In this light, we can see the further last-minute pressure exerted by Angel Merkel on the Greek 
authorities. Indeed, the German chancellor reached out directly to the Greek prime minister to tell 
him that Germany was ready to provide Greece with a bridging loan but that more time was needed 
for bailout talks (Financial Times 2015n). When the deal with Greece had almost been finalized, 
Germany even put at risk the fragile agreement by openly criticizing the new deal as insufficient 
(Financial Times 2015o), while at the same time trying to persuade the IMF to participate in the 
programme24 – participation that was regarded by many as necessary to sell the outcome of the 
negotiations to the Bundestag.  
The chancellor was aware of the effects of Germany’s harder stance in terms of growing 
isolation among euro area countries. However, as has been noted, ‘the chancellor cannot be seen to 
be too accommodating for fear of making it harder to sell a deal to her increasingly sceptical 
conservative CDU/CSU bloc’ (Financial Times 2015q).25 In short, the Bundestag’s involvement in 
the negotiations weighed heavily on the position taken by the German government, significantly 
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In the George Orwell’s Animal Farm, the moment when some animals become more equal than others 
marks the beginning of the end of the ideals that had supported the political project embodied by the 
animals’ takeover of the farm. A similar moment can be discerned in the integration of EU crisis 
management. The involvement of some national parliaments in decisions pertaining to financial 
assistance has contributed to undermining the objectives that had motivated the creation of the crisis 
management system in the first place. Rather than helping restore EU solidarity and fill in a damaging 
institutional vacuum, the ESM provided a venue that nurtured political cleavages. In short, the 
democratic dysfunction associated with having some national parliaments more powerful than others 
has seriously challenged the utility of financial assistance and thus the integration process itself.  
The negotiations of the Greek adjustment programme have provided the natural scenario for 
assessing the distorting dynamic associated with ESM decision-making. In particular, the 
negotiations for the third adjustment programme turned towards a hardened and divisive approach 
that had no counterpart in previous negotiating rounds. This is especially evident in the comparison 
of the German government’s position over time, which hardened in conjunction with the 
empowerment of the Bundestag under the new EU crisis management framework. The incentive for 
division is also evident in the comparison of creditor countries at different stages of the negotiations, 
reflecting the various domestic constraints that each faced. The relaxation of the Finnish position 
towards Greece in the summer of 2015, despite the continuation of the German confrontational 
approach, is indicative in this regard: unlike the Bundestag, the Finnish parliament was not involved 
in the approval of the outcome of the intergovernmental negotiation. 
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In emphasizing the role played by the new institutional context in which the Greek 
negotiations took place, this article has not claimed that other factors were irrelevant to the negotiation 
process, not least the incoherent strategy of the Greek government (Tsebelis 2016), the interactions 
among the Troika institutions (Moschella 2016) or the ideas that informed the positioning of the 
German leadership (Bulmer 2014; Matthijs 2016). However, while each of these factors were 
important at different stages of the negotiations, they were in turn affected by the context in which 
they were operating. For instance, as the article illustrated, the negotiating approach of the German 
chancellor was strongly influenced by the progressive empowerment of the Bundestag under the ESM. 
Merkel moved closer to her finance minister’s hawkish stance at exactly the time that the legislature’s 
approval was required for financial assistance.  
In order to isolate the influence of the domestic institutional constraints on the dynamics of 
the bailout negotiations, the article relied extensively on cross-time and selected cross-country 
comparisons. However, some limitations need to be acknowledged. In particular, the research design 
could not control for the peculiarities of the Germany–Greece relationship. Variations in the political 
relationship with programme countries might plausibly explain differences in negotiation patterns. 
Unfortunately, however, the scope for comparison is limited as the other recipients of financial 
assistance – Ireland and Portugal – were funded under the temporary EFSF (and before the 
involvement of national parliaments) and the ESM programme for Spain was directed at supporting 
the recapitalization of the country’s banking sector only. A viable comparison with the case examined 
in this study could be the negotiations for the ESM programme for Cyprus in 2013. By controlling 
for the institutional factors, future research could thus ascertain the extent to which political 
relationships between countries affect European negotiations.  
The findings of the article speak to a number of studies that examine the foundations of the 
EU integration process. To start with, the study speaks to the research agenda on new 
intergovernmentalism by showing that governments did not always possess almost monopolistic 
bargaining powers on key decisions for rescuing the EU integration project during the crisis. Some 
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of these key decisions – such as the one pertaining to membership of the eurozone – were taken in a 
larger political arena where the national parliaments’ involvement challenged the usual practices of 
deliberation and consensus-decision by governments acting at the EU level (Bickerton, Hodson and 
Puetter 2015). The article also provided empirical evidence for legal concerns that asymmetric powers 
provided to legislatures by virtue of national constitutional rules, case law and legislation can threaten 
the functioning of the monetary union (Fasone 2014). While this asymmetry is important, it has 
received limited attention thus far compared to other processes of differentiation in the EU 
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014; Winzen and Schimmelfennig 2016). Future research is thus 
needed to ascertain why some countries decide to empower their national parliaments in EU-level 
negotiations, while others do not. Likewise, it will be important to ascertain whether national 
divergences exist as to the legislatures that overtly advocate for the expansion of their powers in 
European negotiations. 
The findings of the article also contribute to the academic and political debate on the ways in 
which to fix democratic deficits in the EU political system. Specifically, the study strikes a note of 
caution on the well-established argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policy-
making is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the 
integration project (Bellamy and Weale 2015) The findings here suggest that the positive effect of 
national parliaments’ involvement in EU policy-making cannot be considered automatic: solidarity 
(and possibly integration) can also be negatively affected by such an involvement (see also Jones and 
Matthjis 2017). This is especially the case when such an involvement is uneven – as in the case 
analysed here. However, it is plausible to speculate that even a more egalitarian involvement of 
national parliaments could be just as problematic; at a time in which anti-Europeanist and populist 
forces are increasingly on the rise, having national parliaments decide on the level of intra-EU 
solidarity (especially under conditions of financial stress) is not a reassuring institutional fix to 
address the challenges that the EU integration project faces. The popular trope ‘be careful what you 
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1 Initially provided to countries with balance of payment problems in Central and Eastern Europe, financial assistance has 
ultimately been provided to euro area countries as well. 
2 In addition, the crisis showcased the lack of an institutional framework for managing banks’ solvency crises. However, 
this article solely focuses on the institutional framework that deals with sovereigns’ liquidity and solvency problems. 
3 As will be discussed at greater length below, under the new crisis management system, not all national parliaments are 
involved to the same extent in financial assistance decisions. Instead, the differentiated power that they are assigned stems 
from uneven national constitutional rules and legislation. See Fasone 2014; Kreilinger 2015. 
4 The Troika is the institutional arrangement through which the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF jointly 
administered financial adjustment programs. 
5 The analysis relies on the articles published by the Financial Times covering the negotiations in 2010, 2012 and 2015. 
Articles were retrieved through the Financial Times website and selected from those carrying the tag ‘Greece debt crisis’. 
In addition to the Financial Times articles, and in order to focus in on the evolution of the German government’s position 
in the negotiations, I used Factiva to retrieve the articles published on the websites Der Spiegel Online International 
(www.spiegel.de/international) and Handelsblatt Global, Germany’s leading business daily 
(www.global.handelsblatt.com). In this case, I screened articles based on the combination of the words ‘Bundestag’ with 
‘Greece’ or ‘Greek crisis’. The interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity. Hence, I do not use them to 
support the arguments but as background information only. 
6 As reported in Fabbrini (2015: 50 fn 3). 
7 Among many others, see Hug and König (2002) and Milner and Rosendorff (1996). For a recent attempt to establish 
whether binding domestic constraints increase governments’ international bargaining power, see Rickard and Caraway 
(2014). 
8 For a measurement of domestic constraints see Konig and Slapin (2004).  
9 As of 2009, approximately 80 per cent of the central banks had full responsibility for decisions concerning the LoLR 
function (BIS 2009). 
10 While the theory is quite straightforward, moral hazard concerns and the distributive implications of financial assistance 
have always been thorny issues for the LoLR. For an overview of these issues, see Tucker (2014). 
11 Of course, although the debate on the LoLR at the international level gained momentum in the 1990s, it has more 
ancient roots. For instance, Kindleberger (1973). 
12 The EFSF was set up as a three-year private company under Luxembourg law. 
13 The ESM has been endowed with an effective lending capacity of €500 billion deriving from a capital stock of €700 
billion, of which €80 billion is paid-in capital with the remaining €620 billion as callable capital. Funding is also 
obtained by issuing bonds or other debt instruments on the financial markets.  
14 It is important to note that the ESM Treaty contemplates an emergency procedure that requires a qualified majority of 
85 per cent of the votes cast; the weighted vote of each ESM member state corresponds to its capital share in the ESM. 
This majority gives Germany, France and Italy the right to veto as the three largest economies of the euro area. The 
emergency procedure was not used in the Greek adjustment programme analysed here.  
15  Data on national parliaments’ involvement are drawn from Kreilinger (2015). For an overview of the other 
constitutional decisions that have strengthened national parliaments in the ESM, see Fasone (2014: 19-22) 
16 The ESM was also used to recapitalize the Spanish banking sector in 2012 and to cover Cyprus’s financing needs in 
2013. 
17 Information on the content of the adjustment programmes for Greece is drawn from the IMF regular staff reports on 
Greece from 2010 to 2015. The reports are freely available on the IMF website. 
18 Euro Summit statement, Brussels, 26 October 2011. 
19 Statement by the eurogroup, 21 February 2012. 
20 For the technical details of the 2012 programme, see European Commission (2012). 
21 Greece also became the first advanced economy to miss a payment to the IMF in the 71-year history of the organization. 
22 It is worth recalling that when the Bundestag debated whether to start negotiations with Greece on a new bailout, 60 
CDU/CSU MPs voted against and another five abstained. 
23 By early August, a basic agreement was reached around a programme whose main elements included spending cuts, 
administrative reform and privatization. Remaining unresolved issues included details of a privatization plan and 
proposals on how to raise the budget surplus.  
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24 As reported in the Financial Times (2015p), ‘According to the summary [of IMF Executive Board meeting], Germany’s 
representative to the IMF board said Berlin ‘would have preferred the fund ... move in parallel’ with the eurozone bailout 
talks.’ 
25 Financial Times, Greece strikes outline of debt deal with creditors, 11 August 2015 
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